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Abstract  
This study aims to detect fraudulent financial reporting using diamond fraud analysis. Fraudulent financial 
reporting includes intentional errors, like the removal of an amount or disclosure in financial statements to 
influence the perceptions of users of financial statements. The fraud diamond theory developed by Wolfe and 
Hermanson in 2004 included pressure, opportunity, rationalization, and capability. This study uses secondary 
data. The population in this study were all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2015-2017. The analysis technique used is factor analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. The test 
results prove that pressure, rationalization, and capability are able to predict fraudulent financial reporting. 
While the opportunity is not able to predict fraudulent financial reporting. 
Keywords: Fraud diamond; fraudulent financial reporting; non-financial company.  
1. Introduction  
Financial reports become a media company to provide information to users and are free from material 
misstatements caused by errors or fraud so as not to mislead users of financial statements. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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According to the International Standard on Auditing 240, the factor that distinguishes fraud and error is whether 
the underlying action is in the form of intentional or accidental. Accounting errors such as miscalculations, 
incorrect measurements, false estimates and incorrect interpretations of accounting standards that are 
accidentally caused by miscalculations, incorrect measurements, false estimates and incorrect interpretations of 
accounting standards are referred to as errors. While accounting errors that are done intentionally with the 
purpose of being misleading are called fraud. The fraud cases occur from year to year. Cases of fraud also occur 
in Indonesia. According to data from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in the Asia Pacific 
in 2016, Indonesia got the second rank in the highest number of fraud cases. From 2012 to 2014, from 398 
companies registered consecutively in the non-financial sector at IDX as many as 38 companies or 9.5% 
reported violating Bapepam-LK regulations. Fraud of financial statements is a type of fraud that is detrimental 
to many parties, namely the shareholders, investors, and companies. The shareholders are disadvantaged 
because they think management has worked according to their expectations. Investors suffer losses because 
financial information misleads investors in investment decision making. Losses experienced by the company are 
public inspection, reputation damage, market capital losses, financial penalties and loss of investor trust [9]. 
More information held by managers can lead to actions in accordance with the wishes and interests of 
maximizing their utility (information asymmetry). Information asymmetry is a condition where there is an 
imbalance in information acquisition between management as an information preparer with the shareholders and 
stakeholders in general as users of information users [12].  The asymmetry of information arises because of the 
agency relationship between principal and agents [12]. The assumption of agency theory is based on three basic 
human assumptions, namely: (1) humans are self-interest, (2) humans have limited thinking about future 
perceptions (bounded rationality), and (3) humans always avoid risk (risk-averse) [5]. Based on the assumption 
of basic human nature that causes that information produced by humans for other human beings is always 
questionable in reliability and can be trusted whether or not the information delivered [9]. Some experts have 
found studies on fraud detection. The Fraud Triangle theory was proposed by Cressey in 1953. Fraud can occur 
due to pressure, opportunity, and rationalization [3]. Then in 2004 Wolfe and Hermanson developed diamond 
fraud which was a refinement of the fraud triangle discovered by Cressey in 1953 taking into account the fourth 
element, capability [28]. The condition of the company is now growing and complex compared to the past, and 
fraudsters are now smarter and can access various company information. Deception can occur if someone has 
pressure. Pressure can occur because the company's financial stability is influenced by economic conditions, 
industry or operating conditions of the company [23]. The Fraud Triangle theory explains that management as 
an agent can experience pressure when operating growth is not as good as competitor's performance or industry 
average. Companies that have large enough assets are considered capable of providing maximum returns to 
investors. Management will experience pressure when total assets decline. For this condition, management 
conducts fraudulent financial reporting. The percentage change in total assets shows fraudulent financial 
reporting, because of the high percentage change in total assets as a way of showing stronger corporate earnings 
and financial positions [11]. The study of Loebbecke and his colleagues [14] and Bell and colleagues [2] found 
that when companies experiencing below-average industrial growth, management might be able to conduct 
fraudulent financial reporting to improve company prospects [22]. Pressure can occur due to external pressure 
to meet the expectations of third parties where companies need debt financing so that companies remain 
competitive [23]. The Fraud Triangle theory states that excessive pressure from outsiders on management can 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2019) Volume 47, No  2, pp 84-95 
 
86 
 
cause the risk of fraudulent financial reporting [3]. External pressure can be proxied by the leverage ratio. 
Companies that have a high leverage ratio mean that the company has a large amount of debt and high credit 
risk. The higher the credit risk, the greater the level of attention of creditors to provide loans to companies. 
Therefore, this is one of the things that has become a concern for the company and allows it to be one of the 
causes of the emergence of fraudulent financial reporting [7]. Pressure can occur because personal financial 
needs are threatened by company performance which can be caused by management compensation such as 
bonuses or stock options [23]. Agency relationships cause personal interest assumptions which are human 
nature to prioritize self-interest [5]. The Fraud Triangle theory states that pressure can occur because of the need 
for executives to act like company owners [3]. The more ownership by the company depends on the personal 
financial needs of the company's wealth, the greater the level of fraudulent financial reporting practices. Fraud 
is carried out by management with a dual role as executor and owner by making the performance of certain 
companies to get high dividends and stock returns [27]. The Fraud Triangle theory states that pressure can occur 
due to unrealistic targeting of income and profits from the principal [3]. There is excessive pressure on 
management to meet predetermined financial targets including sales incentives or profitability targets [23]. 
Return on Asset is often used to measure the manager's performance and in determining bonuses, and wage 
increases [22]. Management always tries to present the best performance of the company because it does not 
want to be considered inadequate in managing the company, so management does fraudulent financial reporting 
so that it is considered capable of achieving the set financial targets. Pressure arises when the financial target 
cannot be reached. Low ROA causes management to do fraudulent financial reporting. 
H1: Pressure can predict fraudulent financial reporting.  
Fraud can occur because weak controls provide an opportunity for someone to commit fraud. Opportunities for 
fraud can be in the form of industrial traits that provide opportunities to commit fraud in terms of complexity 
and accounting estimates involving subjective considerations [23]. The Fraud triangle theory explains the 
opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting that can be caused by the complexity of accounting rules and the 
unreliability of information systems [3]. The risk of misstatement can occur on trade accounts receivable. 
Subjective assessment is done to determine the number of accounts that cannot be billed. Managers have the 
authority to list bad credit values [24]. This provides an opportunity for managers to commit fraud. A good 
company will suppress and minimize the number of corporate receivables and increase the company's cash flow 
income [10]. The high value of receivables to sales in the company shows that accounts receivable are assets 
that have a higher risk of manipulation [4]. Companies that have a high ratio of accounts receivable and sales 
can be a sign that managers do fraudulent financial reporting so that the receivables appear smaller.u Weak 
internal controls and ineffective oversight can be opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting [23]. Fraud 
Triangle Theory explained that opportunities can occur because of weak internal control and supervision [3]. 
The proportion of independent audit committees has a negative impact on fraudulent financial reporting. 
Effective supervision will reduce fraudulent financial reporting [22]. Audit committees that work effectively can 
reduce fraud that occurs in the company [1]. A large number of audit committees will reduce fraud cases. The 
larger size of the audit committee will be able to improve the audit committee's oversight function. A large audit 
committee will provide access to greater resources and managerial talent, thus providing more effective 
supervision. The size of the audit committee can reduce earnings management actions carried out by managers 
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in the company [13]. The Fraud Triangle theory explains that opportunities can occur because of the ease of 
accessing illegal information and the complexity of organizational structures [3]. Opportunities derived from the 
organizational structure are related to the complexity and instability of the company in controlling the interests 
of the company [23]. Multi-position directors provide opportunities to compare management policies and 
practices, provide new insights on how companies use other approaches in their business [8]. The organizational 
structure of the company with directors who have complex positions in other companies will minimize the 
occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting. The trust obtained by the director to hold a position in another 
company makes him more competent in managing the company, especially eradicating fraud [27]. 
H2: Opportunity can predict fraudulent financial reporting.  
Humans who have the nature of bounded rationality mean the limitations of rationality [5]. The Fraud Triangle 
theory explains rationalization can occur because the perpetrator seeks justification for his actions [3]. 
Rationalization is an attitude that justifies fraudulent behavior. Rationalization by those responsible for 
governance, management, and employees, allows them to engage or justify fraudulent financial reporting that 
cannot be observed by auditors [23]. The factors that led to the existence of fake financial statements originating 
from rationalization relate to the existence of an unfavorable relationship between management and auditors, as 
well as management failure in managing company finances, as well as earnings management behavior that 
exists within the company. When a public accounting firm in a company makes changes, it can be used as a 
measure of the existence of rationalization [22]. Auditor turnover is done in an effort to eliminate the fraudulent 
traces found by previous auditors. This causes companies to tend to replace their auditors to cover fraud in the 
company. 
H3:  Rationalization can predict fraudulent financial reporting  
Fraud Diamond's theory explains that fraud can occur due to the ability of individuals who are able to carry out 
fraud [27]. Competence is the ability of employees to ignore internal controls, develop concealment strategies 
and control social situations for their personal interests [9]. The changes to the directors are indicated to be able 
to describe the ability to carry out a high-stress tolerance [7]. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) state that the 
position or function of a person in an organization can provide the opportunity to exploit or exploit fraud 
opportunities. Capacity as one of the fraud risk factors underlying the occurrence of fraud. The director's 
changes may indicate fraud [27]. Therefore, the manager's changes are used as proxies for features that may 
involve the occurrence of fraudulent financial reports [21]. 
H4    : Capability can predict fraudulent financial reporting.  
2. Methodology  
This research was conducted at non-financial industrial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
which provided audited financial statement data by accessing and downloading the official Indonesia Stock 
Exchange website through the website www.idx.co.id. The observation period of this study is from 2015 to 
2017. The sampling technique used is the saturated sampling method. The data analysis used in this study is 
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factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. The multiple regression model used in this study is shown in 
the equation as follows. 
Y = α + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3+ β4 X4+ ɛ  
Description:   
Y  = Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
β1, β2, β3, β4 = Regression Coefficient of X1, X2, X3, X4 
X1  =  Pressure 
X2  =  Opportunity 
X1  =  Rationalization 
X2  =  Capability 
ε  =  Error  
The dependent variable in this study is fraudulent financial reporting which is measured using F-score. This F-
score model is the sum of the accrual quality variables with financial performance. The independent variables in 
this study are pressure, opportunity, rationalization, and capability. The four sub-variables used to examine 
pressure are financial stability, external pressure, personal financial needs, and financial targets. The three sub-
variables used to examine opportunity are the nature of the industry, ineffective monitoring, and organizational 
structure. Financial stability is measured using asset growth [22]. External pressure use leverage as its 
measurement [15]. Personal financial need uses insider ownership as a measurement [22]. Financial targets use 
return on assets as its measurement [22]. Nature of industry use changes in accounts receivable as its 
measurement [22]. Effective monitoring uses the percentage of independent audit committees as its 
measurement [22]. Organizational structures use multiple-position percentages as its measurement [8]. The 
auditor switching use dummy variable as measurement. Number 1 shows the company makes voluntary auditor 
changes and 0 if it does not [15].   The change of director uses a dummy variable as measurement. Number 1 is 
given if there is a change of company directors and 0 if there is no change of company directors [7].   
3. Research Result  
3.1 Overview of Research  
This research was conducted at public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Data collection 
is done by using the website www.web.idx.id and the official website of each company to collect audited 
company's annual financial report data. The population in this study are non-financial companies listed on the 
Stock Exchange during the period 2015-2017. Based on the availability of data on the IDX, the samples 
obtained were 276 companies with 797 observations during the observation period. 
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics provide general variables in the study that are intended in mean, standard deviation, 
maximum, and minimum. Descriptive statistical test results are shown in Table 1 as follows.  
Table 1: Result of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Standard  
Deviation  
Pressure 797 0.00 8.31 0.54 0.58 
Opportunity 797 -40.99 39.23 -0.05 2.89 
Rationalization  797 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.48 
Capability  797 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.47 
 
Based on Table 1, it can be explained as follows: Pressure has an average value of 0.54. Observation of 
company leverage values shows that more companies have a fairly low leverage ratio because the average value 
approaches the minimum value of 0.00. The standard deviation of the pressure of 0.58 is greater than the 
average value indicating that the distribution of data is not evenly distributed and also shows the difference in 
data from each other is still relatively high.The opportunity has an average value of -0.05. Observation of the 
value of the change in accounts receivable shows that more companies have a high ratio of changes in accounts 
receivable because the average value approaches the maximum value. The opportunity standard deviation of 
2.89 is greater than the average value indicating that the distribution of data is not evenly distributed and also 
shows that the data differences from each other are still relatively high. Rationalization has an average value of 
0.35. Observation of auditor switching values shows that more companies do not do auditor switching than 
companies that do auditor switching because the average value is close to the minimum value of 0.00. The 
deviation of the Rationalization standard of 0.48 is greater than the average value indicating that the distribution 
of data is not evenly distributed and also shows the difference in data from each other is still relatively high. The 
capability has an average value of 0.33. Observation of the value of change of directors shows that more 
companies do not make changes to directors than companies that make changes to directors because the average 
value approaches the minimum value of 0.00. The deviation of the Rationalization standard of 0.47 is greater 
than the average value indicating that the distribution of data is not evenly distributed and also shows the 
difference in data from each other is still relatively high. 
3.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
1. Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) 
The Kaiser Meyer Olkin test was used to determine the adequacy of the sample. 
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Table 2: Kaiser Mayer Olkin 
Variable  KMO Sig.  
Pressure  0.500 0,252  
Opportunity 0,502 0,041 
The test results shown in Table 2 show the Pressure and Opportunity variables having KMO more than and 
equal to 0.5. This concludes that each indicator in the Pressure and Opportunity variable has a 
sufficient sample for factor analysis. 
2.  Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) 
The feasibility of the factor test model for each variable can be seen from the value of Measures of 
Sampling Adequacy (MSA). 
Table 3: Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
Variable Indicator MSA 
Pressure 
Financial Stability (X1.1) 0,500 
External Pressure (X1.2) 0,534 
Personal Financial Needs (X1.3) 0,479 
Financial Target (X1.4) 0,500 
Opportunity 
Nature of Industry (X2.1) 0,538 
Ineffective Monitoring (X2.2) 0,501 
Organizational Structure (X2.3) 0,501 
The MSA value in the pressure variable which has the highest factor loading value is the External Pressure 
indicator with a value of 0.500. While the MSA value in the Opportunity variable which has the 
highest factor loading value is the Nature of Industry indicator with a value of 0.538. This means that 
the External Pressure indicator is used in factor analysis to represent the pressure variable and the 
Nature of Industry is used in factor analysis to represent the Opportunity variable. 
3.4 Multicollinearity Test  
This test uses a correlation matrix between independent variables to see the magnitude of the correlation 
between independent variables. Multicollinearity Test Results can be seen in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Measure of Multicollinearity Test 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Pressure (X1) 0,919 1,088 
Opportunity (X2) 0,984 1,017 
Rationalization (X3) 0,807 1,240 
Capability  (X4) 0,759 1,317 
Based on Table 4 it can be seen that the tolerance value and VIF of all these variables indicate that the tolerance 
value for each variable is greater than 10% and the VIF value is smaller than 10 which means the regression 
equation model is free from multicollinearity. 
3.5 Autocorrelation Test  
The autocorrelation test is conducted to track the data correlation from year t to year t-1 (before). The 
autocorrelation test is done through a Durbin-Watson test, where the regression model is said to be free from 
autocorrelation if it matches the criteria of du <DW <4-du. 
Table 5: Autocorrelation Test 
dl Du 4-du DW 
1,839 1,920 2,080 1,959 
Table 5 shows that the value of Durbin Watson is 1,959. Because the value of du <dw <(4-du) (1,920 <1,959 
<2,080), it can be concluded that there is no autocorrelation between residuals. 
3.6 Heteroscedasticity test   
This heteroscedasticity test aims to find out whether in the regression model there is an inequality of variance 
from the residual one observation to another observation conducted by the Glejser test. In Table 6 it can be seen 
that the significance values of the Pressure, Opportunity, Rationalization and Capability variables are 0.845; 
0,860; 0.347; and 0.087. This value is greater than 0.05, which means there is no influence between the 
independent variable on the absolute residual. Thus, the model made does not contain symptoms of 
heteroscedasticity. 
Table 6: Heteroscedasticity test 
Variable Sig. 
Pressure 0,845 
Opportunity 0,860 
Rationalization 0,347 
Capability  0,087 
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3.7 Multiple Linear Regression  
Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis as presented in Table 7, the regression equation can 
be made as follows: 
Y = 0,490 + 0,074 X1 + 0,027 X2 + 0,063 X3 + 0,185 X4 
The regression coefficient value of the variable Pressure, Rationalization and Capability has a significance value 
of the t-test less than 0.05. This shows that all independent variables namely Pressure, Rationalization, and 
Capability have a significant influence on the financial reporting fraud variable (Y). Whereas Opportunity has a 
significance value of t-test more than 0.05. This shows that opportunity variables do not have a significant effect 
on fraudulent financial reporting variables (Y). 
Table 7: Multiple Linear Regression 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 0,490 0,019  250,373 0,000 
Pressure (X1) 0,074 0,024 0,108 30,068 0,002 
Opportunity (X2) 0,027 0,018 0,051 10,514 0,130 
Rationalization (X3) 0,063 0,021 0,116 30,090 0,002 
 Capability (X4) 0,185 0,024 0,299 70,723 0,000 
  Adjusted R Square     0,095 
  F Statistik     21,790 
 Signifikansi Uji F     0,000 
4. Discussion  
Pressure can predict fraudulent financial reporting. Excessive pressure from external parties to fulfill 
requirements and obligations will increase management motivation to commit fraud in financial statements. 
[15]. This study is in accordance with [6,25] and Maghfiroh and his colleagues [16], which state The risk of 
greater material misstatement due to fraud can be identified in companies experiencing external pressure and 
greater leverage will have a greater risk of violating credit agreements and lower ability to obtain credit loans.  
Rationalization can predict fraudulent financial reporting. Auditor switching as the proxy of rationalization. The 
higher the intensity of independent auditor turnover results in the easier the management rationalizes its 
fraudulent actions in order to deceive the auditor. Low management integrity will be easier to rationalize frauds 
including by arranging agreements with independent auditors and making auditor changes before the maximum 
engagement period determined by regulations. This research is in line with the research of [6,18,15,20] which 
state that auditor switching is based on fraudulent financial reporting. Auditor turnover can indicate the 
company is committing fraud. Dominant management behavior in dealing with auditors, especially those 
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involving businesses to influence the scope of the auditor's work, or the selection or sustainability of assigned or 
consulted personnel on audit engagements Capability can predict fraudulent financial reporting. The change of 
directors as the proxy of capability is indicated to be able to describe the ability to tolerate high-stress [7]. A 
person's position or function within the organization can provide the ability to make or take advantage of 
fraudulent opportunities [28]. Capability is one of the driving factors behind fraud risk factors underlying the 
occurrence of fraud [28]. This study is in accordance with [6] which state that changes in directors is a condition 
for the creation of risk factors of fraud in the company and someone who has authority also has a greater 
influence on certain situations.  Opportunity cannot predict fraudulent financial reporting. There is an 
opportunity for management as a result of the implications of the conditions of the code law accounting system 
and accounting rules in Indonesia which provide the freedom to choose the accounting method. But 
management did not take advantage of the opportunity to commit fraud. This research is in accordance with 
conducted research by [19,6,25], which states that the nature of the industry has no effect on fraud.  Limitations 
in this study is the study uses the ratio of changes in accounts receivable to measure the nature of industry. 
Research is only done on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, and only in the span of two years, 2015 to 2017. 
5. Conclusion and Implication  
The conclusions from this study are pressure, rationalization, and capability can predict fraudulent financial 
reporting. Meanwhile, opportunity cannot predict fraudulent financial reporting. This study was successful in 
proving that pressure, rationalization, and capability, able to predict fraudulent financial reporting.However, this 
study failed to prove that opportunity can predict fraudulent financial reporting. Future studies can use the 
inventory change ratio to measure the nature of the industry because, in addition to accounts receivable, 
inventory often uses estimates from company management. This ratio shows the change from the previous year 
to the previous year's inventory 
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